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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INDIGENT DEFENSE OR INDIGENT OFFENSE? THE UNASHAMED
JURISPRUDENCE OF BARRING RELIEF FOR DEATH-SENTENCED
INMATES BASED UPON “GARDEN-VARIETY” INEFFECTIVENESS
OF COUNSEL

MARK E. OLIVE*
INTRODUCTION
“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.” 1
This truth has not been obvious in capital state post-conviction and federal
habeas corpus proceedings. The law has crept from no right to counsel in
capital post-conviction proceedings to a statutory right. While many, if not
most, attorneys who handle such cases are highly competent and dedicated,
they do not have to be under Supreme Court precedent. A person today may be
executed due to his or her attorney’s mistakes and incompetence. We should
demand the provision of effective counsel in life or death proceedings.
I. THE CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION PROCESS
Capital and other state criminal cases generally follow a nine-step process,
illustrated here:

* Mark E. Olive is an attorney in private practice in Tallahassee, Florida, who was an invited
speaker at the 2016 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at Saint Louis University School of
Law. This article is an expanded version of some of Mr. Olive’s comments about indigent
defense in capital post-conviction cases. Mr. Olive has been involved in representation of
individuals facing the death penalty at trials, on appeals, and in post-conviction proceedings since
1980.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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After trial and direct appeal (Steps 1–3), a capitally sentenced defendant may
seek relief from constitutional violations like state suppression of material,
exculpatory evidence, 2 juror misconduct, 3 and the ineffectiveness of trial
counsel 4 by filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (Steps 7–9). However, if there is an available state court remedy for the
alleged violation, then the petitioner is required to file first in state court to
“exhaust” the claim (Steps 4–6). 5 Once a claim is exhausted and relief is
finally denied in state court, it is ripe for federal habeas corpus review (Steps
7–9).

2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
3. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440 (2000).
4. Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
5. Presenting a claim in state court is called “exhausting” the claim. This is required by 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). See also Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (stating that
the exhaustion rule is grounded in “comity concerns”; “[t]he purpose of exhaustion is . . . [to]
afford the State a full and fair opportunity to address and resolve the [federal] claim on the
merits.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

INDIGENT DEFENSE OR INDIGENT OFFENSE?

747

II. FUNDING FOR COUNSEL IN CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was little to no funding for state and federal
post-conviction representation. What was provided in capital cases was on a
pro bono basis by attorneys, law firms, and non-profit organizations. 6 Now all
states with the death penalty, except Alabama and Georgia, 7 provide counsel in
capital post-conviction proceedings (Steps 4–7) via legislation, not as a matter
of constitutional right. 8
There was no federal right to counsel in capital habeas corpus proceedings
(Steps 7–9) until 1988 when Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. 9 With
this Act, Congress provided petitioners who seek to have their convictions and
death sentences vacated in proceedings under sections 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (state
judgment) or 2255 (federal judgment), but are financially unable to obtain
adequate representation, with “the appointment of one or more attorneys.” 10 In
Martel v. Clair, 11 the Court addressed Congress’s § 3599 concerns and
intentions:
The new statute grants federal capital defendants and capital habeas petitioners
enhanced rights of representation, in light of what it calls ‘the seriousness of
the possible penalty and . . . the unique and complex nature of the litigation.’
§ 3599(d) (2006 ed.). . . . And the statute aims in multiple ways to improve the
12
quality of representation afforded to capital petitioners and defendants alike.

Congress intended “to promote effective representation” in these proceedings,
a goal § 3599 fulfills in “myriad ways.” 13

6. See Mark E. Olive, Capital Post-Conviction Representation Models: Lessons from
Florida, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L 277 (2007) (hereinafter Post-Conviction Counsel).
7. See Steven H. Pollak, Stop Ga. Death Penalty Until Problems Solved, Report Says: ABA
Study Cites Habeas Issues, Jury Confusion, LAW.COM (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/ar
ticle.jsp?id=1138701911792 [https://perma.cc/G9NY-FTDJ]. See also Barbour v. Haley, 471
F.3d 1222, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2006); A.B.A. EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE
DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE GEORGIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 151 (2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/georgia/
report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8ER-YVEZ].
8. Pollak, supra note 7.
9. 21 U.S.C § 848(q) was the portion of the Act that provided for counsel in capital §§ 2254
and 2255 cases. It was moved to 18 U.S.C § 3599 by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222, 120 Stat. 192, 231 (2006).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (formerly 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)).
11. 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012).
12. Id. at 1284–85 (interpreting former statute 21 U.S.C. § 848(q), which was “repealed and
recodified without change at 18 U.S.C. § 3599” Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1489 (2009)).
The Supreme Court has recognized “this statute grants indigent capital defendants a mandatory
right to qualified legal counsel.” McFarland. v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854 (1994) (emphasis
added).
13. Martel, 132 S. Ct. at 1285. The enhanced representation includes: requiring lawyers to
have more experience than 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) demands in non-capital cases; higher rates of
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III. EFFECTIVE INDIGENT DEFENSE – COUNSEL SHOULD NOT DISAPPEAR OR
BE EXTRAORDINARILY (RATHER THAN SIMPLY NORMALLY) INEFFECTIVE
While counsel are now required for almost all death-sentenced inmates in
post-conviction proceedings, all that counsel must do (with largely only one
exception) is not disappear—not “abandon” the petitioner. This egregiously
low bar for the performance of counsel creates an intolerable risk that
individuals will be executed despite, at best, prejudicial constitutional
violations at the state trial and appeal and, at worst, being actually innocent or
wrongfully sentenced to death.
Capital post-conviction representation is complex, intensely timeconsuming, and “brimming with traps for the unwary.” 14 A series of cases
from the Supreme Court in the last sixteen years has exposed the level of
dysfunction and non-existent lawyering in many of these life-or-death cases,
but has left a baffling and deeply unsatisfying jurisprudence for correcting the
patent injustices.
A.

Supreme Court Approaches to Bad Lawyering
1.

Default and “Cause” to Excuse Them in Federal Courts

A federal district court may decline to address the merits of a claim that
was inexcusably “defaulted” by the petitioner in state court proceedings. A
federal “default” question generally involves an evaluation of whether and how
a claim for relief was presented to and considered by a state court. If a claim in
a federal habeas corpus petition was not presented, or not fully presented, to a

compensation (“in part to attract better counsel”) than § 3006(A) allows; and “more money for
investigative and expert services.” Id.
14. Post-Conviction Counsel, supra note 6, at 280 (for a non-exclusive list of the chores of
effective counsel, see id. at 281–83). “[Q]uality legal representation is necessary in capital habeas
corpus proceedings in light of ‘the seriousness of the possible penalty and . . . the unique and
complex nature of the litigation.’” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 855 (emphasis added) (quoting former
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(7)). “[O]ur carefully crafted doctrines of waiver and abuse of the writ make it
especially important that the first petition adequately set forth all of a state prisoner’s colorable
grounds for relief.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 860 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis added); see also id. at 855–56 (majority opinion); ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline
1.1 and accompanying commentary (rev. ed. 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JDA4-T3XK], reprinted at 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) (“Post-judgment
proceedings demand a high degree of technical proficiency, and the skills essential to effective
representation differ in significant ways from those necessary to succeed at trial. . . . Habeas
corpus actions are governed by a complex set of procedural rules”) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES]; ABA GUIDELINES, Guideline 10.15.1 and accompanying commentary (“The field
is increasingly complex and ever-changing.”).
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state court, it may be considered procedurally defaulted. 15 In addition, a claim
that was presented to a state court, but not in the manner that the state court
normally and regularly requires that it be presented (e.g., an untimely
presentation of the claim), and the state court invokes its state rule to bar
consideration of the claim, 16 a “default” issue arises.
Whether there is a default, and whether a default will be excused so a
district court can reach the federal constitutional merits of a claim, are issues
which require considerable analysis and possibly even the taking of evidence. 17
Even if there has been an enforceable default, a petitioner may receive merits
review of a claim in federal court if he or she can demonstrate “cause” for and
“prejudice” from the default. Cause is established, inter alia, where
trial/appellate counsel were ineffective (Steps 1 and 2). 18 Even otherwise
“unexcused” defaults must be ignored by district courts when to enforce a
default would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 19

15. If a state court remedy remains available, it is possible in some instances to obtain a stay
of federal proceedings while the petitioner returns to state court to present the new claim. See
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).
16. This is called a procedural default. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82–83 (1977).
In order for there to be this type of a default, the state court’s ruling (a) must not be based upon
the federal constitution (that is, the state ruling must be “independent”), and (b) must be based
upon an adequate state ground. Id. at 81. Imposition by the state of a procedural bar, and federal
court recognition of that bar, is
subject to our standards for assessing the adequacy of independent state procedural
grounds to bar all consideration of claims under the national Constitution. . . . In any
given case . . . the sufficiency of a rule to limit all review of a constitutional claim itself
depends upon the timely exercise of the local power to set procedure. “Novelty in
procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by
those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of
their federal constitutional rights.”
Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423 (1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Only a “‘firmly
established and regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent
subsequent review by [a federal court] of a federal constitutional claim.” Id. at 423–24 (citation
omitted).
17. Whether there exists an independent and adequate state court basis for barring a claim is
decided by the district court, and “[w]hether a petitioner’s actions have created a state law
procedural bar is a mixed question of law and fact.” Hansbrough v. Latta, 11 F.3d 143, 144–45
(11th Cir. 1994). Despite a state court finding regarding default, the federal court must make an
independent finding. Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 1994) (default is a
de novo determination).
18. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 725 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496
(1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535–36 (1986).
19. For example, if the evidence and claims reveal that constitutional errors “probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496
(1986), or that the state court process “‘has probably resulted’” in capital punishment for one who
is “‘actually innocent’ of a death sentence,” Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 411 n.6 (1989), no
procedural default can prevent relief for the petitioner. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317 (1995)
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Coleman v. Thompson – No Ineffectiveness “Cause” to Excuse a
Default

It is unclear whether states must provide collateral or post-conviction
review of criminal judgments, 20 but the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v.
Finley 21 there is no constitutional right to an attorney in collateral attacks on
convictions and sentences: “We have never held that prisoners have a
constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their
convictions, and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right
to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.” 22
In Coleman v. Thompson, 23 the Court reaffirmed its holding in Finley and
held that because there is no right to an attorney in post-conviction
proceedings, there is no right to the effective assistance of counsel in such
proceedings. 24 Accordingly, the ineffective assistance of counsel in state postconviction proceedings (Steps 4 and 5) could not constitute cause to excuse a
procedural default at Step 7. 25
Coleman argued that deficient performance by state post-conviction
counsel should constitute “cause” allowing federal courts to consider defaulted
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel because, under
Virginia law, state post-conviction proceedings were the first time that a
petitioner could raise such claims. Coleman’s counsel had raised ineffective
claims properly in the state circuit court (Step 4) but then unreasonably failed
(“[i]f the habeas court were merely convinced that [the] new facts raised sufficient doubt about
[petitioner’s] guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial without the assurance that that
trial was untainted by constitutional error, [the petitioner’s] threshold showing of innocence
would justify a review of the merits of the constitutional claims”). The petitioner raises sufficient
doubt if he or she establishes that it is more likely than not that, in light of the new evidence, no
juror “conscientiously obey[ing] the instructions of the trial court” would have voted to find him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 329. See also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 346–47
(1992) (the “innocence of the death penalty” inquiry “must focus on those elements which render
a defendant eligible for the death penalty”); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 12 (1992)
(“[a] habeas petitioner’s failure to develop a claim in state-court proceedings will be excused and
a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from
failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.”); Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1183 (11th
Cir. 1991) (petitioner must show “that he is ineligible for the death penalty”).
20. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965) (granting certiorari to consider whether
a constitutional right to state post-conviction review exists, but dismissing the grant after
Nebraska adopted a comprehensive state post-conviction review scheme). But cf. Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“State collateral proceedings are not
constitutionally required . . . .”); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (similar).
21. Finley, 481 U.S. 551.
22. Id. at 555 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Murray, 492 U.S. at 10.
23. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
24. Id. at 752.
25. Id. at 752–53.
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to properly assert those claims in an appeal to the higher state court (Step 5).
The Supreme Court found that it need not answer the question of whether there
would be an exception to Finley for claims that could be raised for the first
time in post-conviction proceedings because Coleman’s attorney had presented
Coleman’s ineffective assistance claims on his first opportunity to do so in the
state trial court. The Court found that Coleman was not, in fact, alleging a right
to counsel at his “first” opportunity to assert a constitutional right, but at a
subsequent appellate stage, and this was clearly prohibited under Finley. 26
Thus, Coleman left open the question whether a prisoner has a right to
effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.
3.

Martinez v. Ryan – “Cause” to Excuse the Default of an
Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel Claim Can be Shown by the
Ineffectiveness of Post-Conviction Counsel

This question was resolved in Martinez v. Ryan, 27 but only with respect to
one issue—the ineffective representation by trial counsel. In Martinez, postconviction counsel filed a “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief” necessary to
initiate proceedings in Arizona, but later filed with the court a statement
asserting that she could find no colorable claims for relief. 28 In subsequent
federal habeas corpus proceedings, Martinez argued that he had a federal
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
effective assistance of counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings in state
court with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because it
was his first opportunity to raise such claims. Martinez further argued that
because he received ineffective assistance in his initial-review collateral
proceedings in state court (Step 4), he had established “cause” sufficient to
excuse the default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, and
allow the federal court to review them on their merits (Step 7) even though the
claims never were presented to the state courts.
The Supreme Court refused to find that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments required states to provide effective assistance of counsel to
inmates in state post-conviction proceedings. But the Court held that
ineffective assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings (Step
4) could establish “cause” allowing the federal court (Step 7) to review the
merits of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial (Step 1), if it was
shown that state post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance was the
reason the claim was not properly presented to the state court. 29

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 755.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1313, 1315.
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The Court distinguished its holding in Coleman because Coleman’s
ineffective assistance claims were defaulted on appeal from his initial-review
collateral proceeding, and therefore his claims had been addressed initially on
the merits by the state circuit court that first addressed his post-conviction
petition. 30 The Court emphasized that the difference between Coleman’s case
and Martinez’s was that to enforce the default in Martinez’s case would mean
that no state court would ever hear his claims. 31
The Court held that in order to establish “cause” under Martinez a
petitioner must demonstrate that counsel in his initial-review collateral
proceedings were ineffective under Strickland v. Washington 32—that postconviction counsel acted contrary to prevailing professional norms and that,
but for counsel’s unreasonable actions, the results would have been different. 33
The petitioner must also demonstrate that the underlying claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel “is a substantial one.” 34
Martinez imposed on counsel appointed to represent a federal habeas
petitioner the duty to investigate, develop, and present—and imposed on
federal courts the duty to address—“claim[s] of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence of an attorney) caused a
procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding.” 35 Federal counsel
must litigate and federal courts must resolve whether initial-review
proceedings in state court “may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper
consideration was given to a substantial claim” because petitioner’s state post-

30. Id. at 1316.
31. Id. The Court further emphasized that in Arizona state law required that ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims be brought in the first instance in collateral proceedings, rather
than on direct appeal. Id. at 1317. The Court noted that “[w]here, as here, the initial-review
collateral proceeding is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a
prisoner’s direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.” Id. These principles were further
addressed in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
32. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
33. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
34. Id. (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)). The Court emphasized that its
ruling was an equitable ruling, not a constitutional ruling. Id. at 1319. A constitutional ruling, the
Court reasoned, would create a free-standing constitutional claim, require the appointment of
counsel in every initial-review collateral proceeding, mandate the same system of appointing
counsel in every state, and would require reversal in every case in which the state’s system for
appointing counsel for initial-review collateral proceedings “did not conform to the constitutional
rule.” Id. An equitable ruling, on the other hand, would allow states to maintain a variety of
systems for appointing counsel in collateral proceedings, and even allow them the option to
forego appointing counsel all together. Id. at 1319–20. Should a state choose the latter course, it
either could not assert procedural default in federal habeas proceedings in defense of a state court
decision, or it could simply argue the defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not
“substantial” and, therefore, not cognizable under Martinez. Id. at 1320.
35. Id. at 1318.
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conviction counsel were constitutionally ineffective. 36 The need for effective
assistance of counsel at this initial-review collateral proceeding is especially
acute because “the prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis
for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside the
trial record,” and “the right to [effective trial] counsel is the foundation for our
adversary system” and “a bedrock principle in our justice system.” 37 This
bedrock principle was used to distinguish, and single out for special treatment,
violations of the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel-at-trial claims from other
significant violations which are found to be defaulted by federal courts. 38 The
Court stressed it was creating only a “limited qualification” to Coleman. 39
4.

Maples v. Thomas – Abandonment by Counsel as “Cause” to Excuse a
Procedural Default

Mr. Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Alabama. 40
Following his conviction, two attorneys from a major law firm, acting pro
bono, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court. 41 Before the
petition was decided, the two attorneys left the firm without telling Mr. Maples

36. Id.
37. Id. at 1317 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)). The Court found
that, when a State deliberately chooses to move “trial-ineffectiveness claims” from direct appeal
where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, it “significantly diminishes prisoners’ ability to file
such claims.” Id. at 1318. In the context of this kind of state procedural framework, “counsel’s
ineffectiveness in an initial-review collateral proceeding qualifies as cause for a procedural
default,” and, “as an equitable matter,” allows “a federal habeas court to hear [otherwise
defaulted] . . . claim[s] of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Id.
38. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317–18.
39. Id. at 1319. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, noted:
There is not a dime’s worth of difference in principle between those cases and many other
cases in which initial state habeas will be the first opportunity for a particular claim to be
raised: claims of “newly discovered” prosecutorial misconduct, for example, see Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), claims based on “newly
discovered” exculpatory evidence or “newly discovered” impeachment of prosecutorial
witnesses, and claims asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Court’s
soothing assertion, ante, at 1320, that its holding “addresses only the constitutional claims
presented in this case,” insults the reader’s intelligence.
Id. at 1321.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to review an extension of Martinez:
[Whether] the rule established in Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler, that ineffective
state habeas counsel can be seen as cause to overcome the procedural default of a
substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, also applies to procedurally
defaulted, but substantial, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims?
Davila v. Davis, 650 F. App’x 860 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 580 U.S. 2 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017)
(No. 16-6219).
40. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916 (2012).
41. Id.
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and without requesting to withdraw. 42 The trial court later denied the petition
and sent the notice of its denial to the two attorneys who were no longer at the
firm, and the firm returned the notice unopened. 43 Maple’s deadline for
appealing the denial passed. 44
New attorneys moved the trial court to reissue the order and restart the
appeal clock. 45 The trial court refused, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
denied a petition for mandamus for leave to file an out-of-time appeal, and the
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. 46 Maples sought federal habeas corpus
relief, but the federal district court denied his request based on the procedural
default in state court, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 47
The Supreme Court noted that “negligent conduct” by an attorney “agent”
would not provide “cause” to excuse a default. 48 The Supreme Court reversed,
however, holding that the abandonment of Maples by his attorneys provided
“cause” to excuse the procedural default in state court. 49 “Cause” for excusing
a procedural default exists where something external to the defendant impeded
his ability to comply with the state’s procedural rule. 50 The Court held that the
attorneys’ abandonment of Maples severed their agency relationship so the
failure to appeal could not be attributed to Maples. 51 Maples was “left without
any functioning attorney,” 52 which provided cause to excuse his procedural
default.
B.

Holland v. Florida – Equitable Tolling of the AEDPA Statute of
Limitations for Exceptional Circumstances – Attorney Misconduct

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) is
the federal statutory scheme under which habeas corpus petitions are
adjudicated. 53 Under the AEDPA there is a one year statute of limitations for
filing a federal habeas corpus petition. 54 Lawyers cannot seem to manage to
42. Id. at 916–17.
43. Id. at 917.
44. Id.
45. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 917.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 922.
49. Id.
50. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923.
51. Id. at 917.
52. Id. at 927.
53. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2014). The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of
state collateral review. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”).
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count to 365. 55 In Holland v. Florida, the Eleventh Circuit held that a lawyer’s
gross negligence of not timely filing a federal habeas petition, absent a finding
of “bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth on the
lawyer’s part,” 56 could never warrant equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of
limitations. The Supreme Court held this “standard [was] too rigid” 57 and
equitable tolling was available if a petitioner “shows ‘(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” 58 In Mr. Holland’s case, his
lawyers’ egregious actions, and Holland’s due diligence, raised sufficient
questions about equitable tolling to warrant a remand. 59
Absent “extraordinary circumstances,” however, habeas corpus petitioners
must live with and die for attorney ineffectiveness. 60 “[G]arden variety”
ineffectiveness by counsel is forgiven. 61

55. Jonathan Atkins, Danielle B. Rosenthal & Joshua D. Weiss, The Inequities of AEDPA
Equitable Tolling: A Misapplication of Agency Law, 68 STAN. L. REV. 427, 431, n. 13 (2016) (as
of 2014, “[s]ince Congress passed AEDPA in 1996, lawyers for at least eighty petitioners
sentenced to death have missed the statute’s one-year filing deadline for federal habeas review.”)
56. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
57. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010).
58. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
59. With respect to extraordinary circumstances, the Court held:
Here, Collins [appointed counsel] failed to file Holland’s federal petition on time despite
Holland’s many letters that repeatedly emphasized the importance of his doing so. Collins
apparently did not do the research necessary to find out the proper filing date, despite
Holland’s letters that went so far as to identify the applicable legal rules. Collins failed to
inform Holland in a timely manner about the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court
had decided his case, again despite Holland’s many pleas for that information. And
Collins failed to communicate with his client over a period of years, despite various pleas
from Holland that Collins respond to his letters. . . .
Id. at 2564.
With respect to due diligence, the Court held:
Here, Holland not only wrote his attorney numerous letters seeking crucial information
and providing direction; he also repeatedly contacted the state courts, their clerks, and the
Florida State Bar Association in an effort to have Collins—the central impediment to the
pursuit of his legal remedy—removed from his case. And, the very day that Holland
discovered that his AEDPA clock had expired due to Collins’ failings, Holland prepared
his own habeas petition pro se and promptly filed it with the District Court.
Id. at 2565. On remand, the district court granted equitable tolling. Order Following November
18, 2010 Status Conference Requiring Filing of Amended Petition and Setting Briefing Schedule,
Holland v. Florida, 1:06-CV-20182 (S.D. Fla., Nov. 22, 2010).
60. Id. at 2562.
61. Id. at 2564.
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C. Substitution of Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings –
Conflicts of Interest
At times an appointed federal capital attorney seeks to withdraw from his
or her appointment, or the petitioner seeks new counsel. In Clair, supra, the
Supreme Court held that general, run-of-the-mill withdrawal and substitution
motions under § 3599, based upon disagreements between counsel and client,
are controlled by an “interest of justice” standard. 62 However, withdrawal and
substitution motions premised on a conflict of interest were different: “the
court would have to appoint new counsel if the first lawyer developed a
conflict.” 63 The district court judge in Clair had noted: “[n]o conflict of interest
. . . is shown.” 64
But if a conflict of interest is shown, then counsel must be removed, as the
Court later held in Christeson v. Roper. 65 Mr. Christeson was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. 66 After additional state proceedings, under the
one-year statute of limitations imposed by the AEDPA, his federal habeas
petition was due on April 10, 2005. 67 Nine months before the deadline, the
District Court appointed attorneys to represent Mr. Christeson. 68 The attorneys
did not meet with Mr. Christeson until more than six weeks after his petition
was due and filed the petition 117 days late. 69 They justified their failure to
meet with Mr. Christeson and timely to file his habeas petition on a simple
miscalculation of the AEDPA limitations period. 70 The federal district court
dismissed the petition as untimely. 71
Seven years later, these attorneys contacted new attorneys who filed a
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking to reopen the
district court’s final judgment on the ground that the AEDPA’s statute of

62. Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1287 (2012). The Court explained “interest of justice”:
As its name betrays, the “interests of justice” standard contemplates a peculiarly contextspecific inquiry. So we doubt that any attempt to provide a general definition of the
standard would prove helpful. In reviewing substitution motions, the courts of appeals
have pointed to several relevant considerations. Those factors may vary a bit from circuit
to circuit, but generally include: the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the district
court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint,
including the extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication between lawyer and
client (and the client’s own responsibility, if any, for that conflict).
Id.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Clair, 132 S. Ct. at 1286 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1282.
Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015).
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Christeson, 135 S. Ct at 892.
Id.
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limitations should have been equitably tolled. 72 Because previous counsel
could not litigate their own failures, Mr. Christeson requested substitute
counsel. 73 The District Court denied the motion for substitution, and the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 74
The Supreme Court reversed:
Tolling based on counsel’s failure to satisfy AEDPA’s statute of limitations is
available only for “serious instances of attorney misconduct.” Holland v.
Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 651–652 (2010). Advancing such a claim would have
required [counsel] to denigrate their own performance. Counsel cannot
reasonably be expected to make such an argument, which threatens their
professional reputation and livelihood. See Restatement (Third) of Law
Governing Lawyers §125 (1998). Thus, as we observed in a similar context in
Maples v. Thomas, 565 U. S. ___, ______, n. 8 (2012) (slip op., at 17, n. 8), a
“significant conflict of interest” arises when an attorney’s “interest in avoiding
damage to [his] own reputation” is at odds with his client’s “strongest
75
argument—i.e., that his attorneys had abandoned him.”

The Supreme Court found “Christeson might properly raise a claim for relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b),” 76 arguing that prior counsel’s conduct provided a
basis for equitable tolling. The Court relied on Maples, 77 a case about “cause”
for procedural defaults, not about equitable tolling. 78 Mr. Christeson lost on
remand and was executed. 79

72. Id. at 892. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) entitles the moving party to relief from
judgment on several grounds, including the catch-all category “any other reason that justifies
relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (2016). To be granted, a motion under subsection (b)(6) requires,
inter alia, a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535
(2005). Federal courts are split on whether the decision in Martinez is an “extraordinary
circumstance” that could warrant Rule 60(b) relief under Gonzalez.
73. Christeson, 135 S. Ct at 892.
74. Id. at 893.
75. Id. at 894. Initial federal counsel “abandoned” Mr. Christeson:
[Counsel] failed to meet with Christeson until more than six weeks after his petition was
due. There is no evidence they communicated with their client at all during this time.
They finally filed the petition on August 5, 2005–117 days too late. . . . A legal ethics
expert . . . stated in a report submitted to the District Cout: “[I]f this is not abandonment, I
am not sure what would be.”
Id. at 892 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 895.
77. Id. at 894.
78. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012). Even though Maples was a “cause” to
excuse a procedural default case, and Holland, supra, was an equitable tolling of the AEDPA
statute of limitations case, some courts have held that Maples effectively overruled Holland. See
Atkins, supra note 54, at 438. Since Holland and Maples, courts of appeals have taken different
approaches on whether only abandonment may satisfy the extraordinary circumstances for
equitable tolling. Id. at 439. Several circuits have held that “a range of attorney misconduct not
limited to abandonment,” govern the extraordinary circumstances inquiry. Luna v. Kernan, 784
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D. The Operation of 18 U.S.C. § 3599 and Abandonment
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e), attorneys appointed in federal capital habeas
corpus proceedings are required to continue to represent the petitioner even
when the case has completed (Step 9), i.e., after federal habeas corpus has been
denied, the denial has been affirmed, and a petition for writ of certiorari has
been denied:
Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s own motion
or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed shall represent the
defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings,
including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals,
applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and all available post-conviction process, together with applications for stays
of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and shall also
represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for
80
executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant.

“Under § 3599(e), a lawyer appointed to represent a capital defendant is
obligated to continue representing his client until a court of competent
jurisdiction grants a motion to withdraw.” 81 Unfortunately some attorneys and
clerks are unaware of this requirement. 82

F.3d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Ross v. Sarano, 712 F.3d 784, 800 (3d Cir. 2013)
(recognizing “an attorney’s malfeasance” may warrant tolling); Whiteside v. United States, 775
F.3d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 2014) (characterizing Holland as a case of “extraordinary negligence”);
Schmid v. McCauley, 825 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying Christeson, holding that
abandonment “is one potentially extenuating circumstance” supplying the requisite extraordinary
circumstances). Others have espoused a categorical position that attorney abandonment is needed.
See Thomas v. Atty. Gen., Florida, 795 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015); Rivas v. Fischer, 687
F.3d 514, 538 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Maples); Mack v. Falk, 509 F. App’x 756, 759 (10th Cir.
2013) (identifying abandonment under Maples as providing the extraordinary circumstances for
tolling); United States v. Wheaton, 826 F.3d 843, 852 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding no abandonment
and thus no extraordinary circumstances for tolling); Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 727 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (construing Maples to have clarified the extraordinary circumstances analysis in tolling
cases).
79. Christeson v. Griffith, 845 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 2017); Jim Salter, Missouri
executes man for killing woman, 2 children in 1998, WASH. TIMES, http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2017/jan/31/missouri-inmate-faces-execution-for-killing-family/ [https://perma.cc/J2
KN-UNNB].
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e) (2012).
81. Battaglia v. Stephens, 824 F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 2016).
82. The following letter was sent to a client who had appointed counsel for federal habeas
corpus purposes:
As I have explained before, I was appointed to represent you before the United States
federal courts. My representation of you ended with the conclusion of the case before the
United States Supreme Court, when your request for issuance of a writ of certiorari was
denied. I am told by the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
that my court appointed representation does not continue into state court matters.
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[CJA counsel] expressly stated that he believes that his representation does not
extend to state competency proceedings. This belief is mistaken. Under §
3599(e), counsel “shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent
stage of available judicial proceedings, . . . and shall also represent the
defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or
83
other clemency as may be available to the defendant.

“We conclude that [CJA counsel] “abandoned” Battaglia for purposes of
pursuing a Ford claim.” 84 The Court concluded it had jurisdiction to enter a
stay of Mr. Battaglia’s execution, appoint new counsel, and conduct further
proceedings even though this case had completed the nine-step process. 85
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REQUIRE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
FEDERAL AND STATE POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES
Martinez, Holland, and Maples represent progress in policing the
performance of counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings. But, they
insulate shabby representation in hundreds of cases. Other than for a claim of
trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, appointed post-conviction counsel in capital
cases are not accountable to their clients or the courts for what they do
unreasonably and prejudicially wrong. Absent disappearing, evaporating as
counsel, not functioning at all, or being extraordinarily (as opposed to
ordinarily) incompetent, these post-conviction attorneys’ conduct binds a death
sentenced client’s hands and seals their fate. This is unconscionable.
Proof of an utterly unconstitutional trial or sentencing, negligently not
raised at Step 4, will not be heard at Step 7. A lawyer’s failure timely to file a
federal petition (Step 7) will not be corrected unless counsel utterly abandoned
their clients. Death-sentenced inmates have been and will continue to be
executed without any review of substantial claims for relief.
This is not indigent defense; it is indigent offense. It is shameful that a
thing called “ordinary, run-of-the-mill, garden variety, attorney neglect and
ineffectiveness” in post-conviction proceedings operates to bar condemned

Nevertheless, if you wish to challenge this death sentence, please write to the District
Court and to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and ask for the appointment of a lawyer
to continue to represent you in the state courts. Again, I provide you with the address to
both of these courts below.
A copy of the letter is on file with the author.
83. Battaglia, 824 F.3d at 474. “Competency proceedings” are proceedings pursuant to Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 US 399 (1986), where the Supreme Court held that death sentenced inmates
had to be mentally competent at the time of execution. See id. at 474–75.
84. Id. at 474.
85. Id. at 474–75. “Battaglia effectively lacked counsel to prepare his claim of
incompetency. In our view, it would be improper to approve his execution before his newly
appointed counsel has time to develop his Ford claim. A stay is needed to make Battaglia’s right
to counsel meaningful.” Id. at 475.
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persons from challenging their convictions and sentences. The fact that there is
“garden variety” ineffectiveness means there is a lot of ineffectiveness going
around. What civilized system of law has an entire category for incompetence
called “ordinary” that must be tolerated?
These condemned petitioners cannot receive appointed counsel of choice
and cannot be expected to understand and navigate the shoals of postconviction and habeas corpus jurisprudence when even their protectors’
ignorance and incompetence is excused. An attorney’s ineffectiveness should
not be the obstacle to hearing a (1) substantial claim of any constitutional error;
(2) a petitioner’s defense to a missed statute of limitations; or (3) any other
substantial argument in favor of vacating the state court death judgment. The
illusion of counsel cannot be allowed to make judges and the public
comfortably numb. Ordinary failures when it comes to executing people should
be ferreted out and corrected, not embraced as an institutional reason not to
listen.

